Matrix factorization is a popular method to build a recommender system. In such a system, existing users and items are associated to a low-dimension vector called a profile. The profiles of a user and of an item can be combined (via inner product) to predict the rating that the user would get on the item. One important issue of such a system is the so-called cold-start problem: how to allow a user to learn her profile, so that she can then get accurate recommendations? While a profile can be computed if the user is willing to rate well-chosen items and/or provide supplemental attributes or demographics (such as gender), revealing this additional information is known to allow the analyst of the recommender system to infer many more personal sensitive information. We design a protocol to allow privacy-conscious users to benefit from matrix-factorization-based recommender systems while preserving their privacy. More precisely, our protocol enables a user to learn her profile, and from that to predict ratings without the user revealing any personal information. The protocol is secure in the standard model against semi-honest adversaries.
Introduction
Matrix factorization [4, 8] is a popular method to build a recommender system. As exemplified by the Netflix Prize competition [14] , it has become a dominant technology within collaborativefiltering recommenders. Matrix factorization provides a better predictive accuracy compared to classical neighborhood methods while at the same time is scalable and offers much flexibility for modeling a variety of real-life situations [10] .
The cold-start problem. A major problem facing collaborative-filtering recommender systems is how to provide recommendations when rating data is too sparse for a subset of users or items. As a special case, the so-called cold-start problem [20] is how to make recommendations to new users who have not yet rated any item or to deal with new items that have not yet been rated by users. a user to the analyst. Recent research has indeed demonstrated that this can be used by the analyst to infer private user attributes such as political affiliation [11, 19] , sexual orientation [11] , age [22] , gender [19, 22] , and even drug use [11] . Further privacy threats are reported in [2, 3, 13] .
A natural question therefore raised in [7] is how a privacy-conscious user can benefit from recommender systems while preventing the inference of her private information.
Contributions. In this paper, we show how a privacy-conscious user can learn her profile without revealing any information to the analyst. The protocol is practical and proven secure against semihonest adversaries. The communication complexity of the protocol only grows with the square-root of the number of items.
Once the privacy-conscious user learns her profile u, she can run a straightforward protocol to learn the predicted rating of any item j in the database. This indeed only requires to compute the inner product between the user profile u (known to the user) and the item profile v j (known to the analyst) [15, Sect. 4.1] .
Related work. In [7] , Ioannidis et al. propose a learning protocol which enables the user to prevent the analyst from learning some (previously defined) private user attributes. This protocol perfectly hides these chosen attributes to the analyst, in an information-theoretic way. The authors also prove that no such protocol can be more accurate, when the analyst ends up knowing the resulting profile, nor can disclose less information for the same accuracy.
Unfortunately, this protocol has also several drawbacks, most of them inherent to the fact it is information-theoretically secure and does not rely on computational assumptions. First, this protocol still needs to disclose some information about the analyst database to everybody. Second, this protocol is not as accurate as a non-privacy-preserving protocol would be. This is inherent to the fact that Ioannidis et al. restricted themselves to protocols where the analyst learns an approximate profile of the user at the end, so that the resulting user profile shall not contain any information about the private attribute. Third, it can only hide a small fixed set of attributes: all attributes which are not explicitly hidden may be recovered by the analyst. And it may be hard for a user to decide which attributes are really important to her, due to the wide range of possible attributes. Finally, the analyst needs to ask users 1 to reveal which attributes they deem private. This may not only bother a lot these users, but also brings up the question of the reliability of these data. No user will be likely admitting she is a drug addict, for example, even if she is ensured that this data will not be disclosed. 2 
Preliminaries
R is the field of real numbers. For any integer n, Z n is the ring of integers modulo n, while Z * n is its multiplicative group. Vectors are always column vectors and are denoted as u or v j . Matrices are denoted with capital letters.
Cryptographic tools
Public-key encryption. A public-key encryption scheme is defined by three algorithms: KeyGen, Enc, and Dec. (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1 κ ) generates a matching pair of public key pk and secret key sk, given a security parameter 1 κ (unary notation). The public key pk is used to encrypt a message x ∈ M into a ciphertext c: c ← Enc(pk, x). The secret key sk is used to decrypt a ciphertext c: x ← Dec(sk, c). We assume that the encryption scheme is perfectly correct and semantically secure (i.e., IND-CPA) [6] .
Homomorphic encryption. An additively homomorphic encryption scheme is such that the message set M is an additive group, and there exists a randomized operation + such that Enc(pk, x) + Enc(pk, y) is distributed identically to a fresh ciphertext of x + y. This operation can be extended to a scalar multiplication by an integer k: k Enc(pk, x) is a fresh ciphertext of k · x; that is,
To simplify the notation, we will sometimes use x pk for Enc(pk, x) and omit pk when clear from the context. We so have x + y = x + y and k · x = k x .
Example 1 (Paillier encryption scheme). We recall the Paillier encryption scheme [17] , which is an homomorphic encryption scheme that is semantically secure under the Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumption. (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1 κ ) generates two large equal-length primes p and q, computes n = pq, and sets λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) and µ = λ −1 mod n. The public key is pk = n while the secret key is sk = (n,
Oblivious transfer. A 1-out-of-M oblivious transfer (OT) protocol is a cryptographic protocol between two parties: a sender and a receiver. The receiver has an index j * ∈ {1, . . . , M } as input. The sender knows a database {x j } j=1,...,M . At the end of the protocol, the receiver learns x j * , while the sender learns nothing.
As in our protocol M is the number of items in the database, we need to use practical OT protocols with communication complexity sublinear in M . We propose to use as 1-out-of-M OT the basic PIR (Private Information Retrieval) protocol in [16, Sect. 2.2] using the Paillier homomorphic encryption scheme, together with a classical 1-out-of-√ M OT [12] which is used to mask the PIR database. The resulting OT has two rounds (one message from the receiver to the sender followed by one message from the sender to the receiver) and its communication complexity is proportional to √ M .
Matrix factorization
The goal of matrix factorization is to predict unobserved ratings r i,j for some user i and some item j, given access to a set D of user/item pairs (i, j) for which a rating r i,j ∈ R has been generated. Matrix
This allows the analyst to predict missing ratings (i.e., those with (i, j) / ∈ D). Vector u i is referred to as the profile of user i while vector v j as the profile of item j.
Learning the profile of a user
Specifically, when a new user wishes to use the service, she submits a batch of s ratings {r j } j∈S for a subset S of s ≥ d items. Upon receiving these ratings, the analyst can estimate her profile u through the following least-squares estimation, 3 arg min
and subsequently predict ratings for items j / ∈ S, using Eq. (1).
Defining matrix V S = ( v j1 . . . v js ) ∈ R d×s and column vector r = (r j1 , . . . , r js ) ⊺ ∈ R s , the profile u of a user can be computed as follows:
Our learning protocol
We design a two-round learning protocol between a privacy-conscious user i and an analyst, allowing the user to learn her profile u from her (private) ratings {r j } j∈S , where S = {j 1 , . . . , j s }. At the end of the protocol, the analyst will learn nothing (except the size s of S), while the user will only learn her profile u and nothing else about the analyst database (except the dimension d, the database of items and its size M , and bounds B r and B v on entries of ratings r j and of profiles of items v j , respectively).
We insist that our protocol hides the set of actual items S that the user is rating as they might already leak significant information about her. If an upper bound S on |S| is known, the exact size s of S can trivially be masked by adding fake items (with profile 0 and fake rating 0) so that the protocol always uses a set S of size S.
Protocol
Consider the ring Z n . We assume that n is either a prime or is hard to factor, so that for all intents and purposes Z n behaves as a field (since a non-zero non-invertible element of Z n would yield a factor of n). Up to using fixed point arithmetic (e.g., by multiplying values by some integer 2 ℓ ), we suppose that the entries of V S and r are integers, and so can be considered as elements of Z n . Round 1. The user generates a key pair (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1 κ ) for the homomorphic encryption scheme and encrypts her ratings r j k : c k ← r j k for 1 ≤ k ≤ s. She also initiates s independent OT protocols as a receiver with respective selection indexes j 1 , . . . , j s .
Round 2. The analyst generates and computes the following matrices (over Z n and over the ciphertext space respectively):
where {R k } 1≤k≤s and {ρ k } 1≤k≤s are uniformly random matrices and vectors summing up to zero in Z d×d n and Z d n respectively, and R 0 is a uniform matrix in GL(d, Z n ) (the group of invertible matrices in Z d×d n ). The analyst then answers the k-th OT message from the user, as an OT sender with database x k,j = (A k,j , α k,j ) 1≤j≤M .
Final step. The user receives x k,j k = (A k,j k , α k,jk ) through the OT protocols. We write A k = A k,j k and α k = Dec(sk, α k,jk ). We then remark that, in Z n :
So if n is large enough, the user can compute back u using rational reconstruction [21, 5] (we recall that u satisfies Eq. (3) over the rationals, and that u is not necessarily an integer).
Bounds for correctness. The scheme is correct when the above rational reconstruction succeeds. From [21, 5] and Hadamard's inequality, we can show correctness when n > 2d d+1/2 s 2d+1 B 4d+1 V B r , where B V and B r are upper bounds on the absolute values of the coefficients of the item profiles v j and of the ratings r j , respectively. For example, if B V = 2 20 , B r = 4, d = 8, s = 10, this is already satisfied for an integer n of 806 bits.
Security. Security against semi-honest adversaries follows from the security of the OT protocol, the IND-CPA property of the homomorphic encryption scheme, and from the following fact: since V S · V ⊺ S is invertible and GL(d, Z n ) is a group, {A k } k and {α k } k only reveal u.
Instantiation using Paillier homomorphic encryption scheme
The scheme can be instantiated using the Paillier encryption scheme and the OT described in Section 2. We can use the internal construction of the OT, to avoid sending ciphertexts of r j k . Concretely, in the OT construction, the user encrypts a vector (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0) used to "select" the correct value to be received. If we use two OT protocols for each k, one for A k and one for α k (instead of a single one for the pair (A k , α k )), then for the second OT, the user just encrypts r j k instead of 1, she will receive r j k times the value to be received.
The resulting protocol for M = 100 items, dimension d = 8, and s = 10 ratings from the user (modulus n of size 1024 bits for Paillier encryption scheme and an elliptic curve over a 256-bit prime field for the base OT [12] ), has the following performance on a non-optimized single-thread implementation (on a laptop, CPU Intel® i7-7567U, 3.5GHz, turbo 4GHz): less than 0.4s to generate the first round by the user, less than 150s to generate the second round by the analyst, less than 1.4s to finalize the protocol by the user. The user requires less than 2s of computation (excluding communication). The analyst time is mostly spent in the exponentiations required in the OT protocol (modulo n 2 ): there are M · (d 2 + d) · s of them. These exponentiations can be trivially parallelized. The communication complexity is less than 2MB and essentially grows linearly with √ M .
